[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
the other, the rogue states and the terror network with unworldly
motivations (583). The two elements of Campbell s characterization
of the working of identity are most clearly present here.
First, there is the projection of responsibility and evil entirely
outside of oneself onto the other. International law merely functions
as an additional, boundary-drawing instrument to achieve this goal.
Of course, the Community of Democracies and the rogue states and
non-state terrorist networks are an, as it were, standard postmodern
example of a binary opposition. The self and the other are not sep-
arate. They are a single entity. The second dimension of Campbell s
analysis, here vitally illuminated by Gaddis, is the repetitive applica-
tion of this defensive identity mechanism, through the specific instru-
ment of the preemptive attack on terrorists and rogue states, following
the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the communist
menace. Gaddis himself thinks the Cold War was remarkable for
American abstention from the doctrine of preemptive attack, but he
does say it will appear where America feels most acutely threatened,
America meaning the embattled post-Westphalian unsuccessfully sec-
ularized identity of which both Campbell and Jewett/ Lawrence write.
Finally, John Yoo, in International Law and the War in Iraq,24
operating within the same parameters as Wedgwood (i.e. non-state
terrorist networks and rogue states) elaborates considerably on
Wedgwood s analysis of how defensive measures to counter the
unpredictable violence of states and non-state actors should inform a
reading of Article 51, etc. The three criteria for the use of preemptive
force that Yoo elaborates all depend upon judgments about levels of
danger and material perceptions of the other. The first question is
whether a nation has WMD and the inclination to use them. Apart
from the Iraq case, in future the decision will depend upon intelli-
gence about rogue nations WMD programs and their ability to
assemble a weapon (575). The second question nations will have to
take into account is what Yoo calls the available window of oppor-
tunity. The problem is, of course, the suicide bomber, immune to
traditional methods of deterrence, besides being difficult to trace in
innocent populations. The window of opportunity may exist for the
United States and its allies before a rogue nation transfers weapons
to a terrorist organization. If it had to wait for the transfer to occur,
it would be more difficult for the United States, for example (now
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American Legal Cultures of Collective Security 161
apparently without its allies), to act, given the sporadic nature of ter-
rorist attacks (575). The third question, or consideration, is the
degree of harm from a WMD attack, given that the combination of
the vast potential for destructive capacity of WMD and the modest
means required for their delivery make them more of a threat than the
military forces of many countries (575).
The final stage of Yoo s argument has the merit that it is reduces to
nonsense a whole tradition of secular authority in international rela-
tions that Campbell highlights as beginning with Hobbes and the
Westphalia settlement: the apparent construction of order based upon
the opposition of the domestic and the foreign and the paradox of a
state system, which rests upon the mutually exclusive suppositions
that each is a self for itself and an other for all the others. Yoo finds
himself, along with the whole of the international law profession,
trapped in what is not a logic of his own making. Starting from the
reasonable supposition that the degree of harm from an WMD attack
would be catastrophic, he appears to commit himself to the view that
danger is unlimited in degree, all-pervasive in extent, and requiring
ceaseless preemptive attacks. In other words, we are in an impossible
position, at the bankrupted end of an international law tradition:
Thus, even if the probability that a rogue nation would attack the United
States directly with WMD were not certain, the exceptionally high degree
of harm that would result, combined with a limited window of opportun-
ity and the likelihood that if the United States did not act, the threat would
increase, could lead a nation to conclude that military action is necessary
in self-defense. Indeed, as President Bush recently cautioned: If we wait
for threats fully to materialize, we will have waited too long. (576)
Notes
1 Revised edition (1998).
2 Ibid., 46.
3 Ibid., 47, quoting Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age
(1983), xxiv.
4 Ibid., 48 50.
5 Ibid., 51.
6 Ibid., 65.
7 Ibid., 31.
8 Ibid., 62.
9 Ibid., 65.
10 In The Dilemma of Zealous Nationalism (2003).
11 Harvard University Press, 2004.
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162 Philosophy of International Law
12 Especially chapters 5 and 6.
13 Harvard University Press, 1990.
14 New York Times, October 17, 2004. I am grateful to my Westminster
and American law colleague Andrea Jarman for bringing this article to
my attention.
15 Jewett and Lawrence explain Wallis s own theological views about
responses to 9/11 at CACAE, 3.
16 Council of Foreign Relations (1997).
17 Cambridge, 2004, 192.
18 The United States etc., 155.
19 Ibid., 160 1.
20 AJIL 97, No. 3 (July 2003) 628 42.
21 The United States etc., 155 and 161.
22 AJIL 97, No. 3 (July 2003) 585 90.
23 AJIL 97 No. 3 (2003) 576 85.
24 AJIL 97 (2003) 563 76.
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6
MARXISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
1
INTRODUCTION
Rumors of the death of socialism have been, oddly enough, accom-
panied by rumors of the disappearance of the United States. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl exclamation.htw.pl
the other, the rogue states and the terror network with unworldly
motivations (583). The two elements of Campbell s characterization
of the working of identity are most clearly present here.
First, there is the projection of responsibility and evil entirely
outside of oneself onto the other. International law merely functions
as an additional, boundary-drawing instrument to achieve this goal.
Of course, the Community of Democracies and the rogue states and
non-state terrorist networks are an, as it were, standard postmodern
example of a binary opposition. The self and the other are not sep-
arate. They are a single entity. The second dimension of Campbell s
analysis, here vitally illuminated by Gaddis, is the repetitive applica-
tion of this defensive identity mechanism, through the specific instru-
ment of the preemptive attack on terrorists and rogue states, following
the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the communist
menace. Gaddis himself thinks the Cold War was remarkable for
American abstention from the doctrine of preemptive attack, but he
does say it will appear where America feels most acutely threatened,
America meaning the embattled post-Westphalian unsuccessfully sec-
ularized identity of which both Campbell and Jewett/ Lawrence write.
Finally, John Yoo, in International Law and the War in Iraq,24
operating within the same parameters as Wedgwood (i.e. non-state
terrorist networks and rogue states) elaborates considerably on
Wedgwood s analysis of how defensive measures to counter the
unpredictable violence of states and non-state actors should inform a
reading of Article 51, etc. The three criteria for the use of preemptive
force that Yoo elaborates all depend upon judgments about levels of
danger and material perceptions of the other. The first question is
whether a nation has WMD and the inclination to use them. Apart
from the Iraq case, in future the decision will depend upon intelli-
gence about rogue nations WMD programs and their ability to
assemble a weapon (575). The second question nations will have to
take into account is what Yoo calls the available window of oppor-
tunity. The problem is, of course, the suicide bomber, immune to
traditional methods of deterrence, besides being difficult to trace in
innocent populations. The window of opportunity may exist for the
United States and its allies before a rogue nation transfers weapons
to a terrorist organization. If it had to wait for the transfer to occur,
it would be more difficult for the United States, for example (now
M637 CARTY TEXT M/UP.qxd 16/1/07 9:46 AM Page 161 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Ga
American Legal Cultures of Collective Security 161
apparently without its allies), to act, given the sporadic nature of ter-
rorist attacks (575). The third question, or consideration, is the
degree of harm from a WMD attack, given that the combination of
the vast potential for destructive capacity of WMD and the modest
means required for their delivery make them more of a threat than the
military forces of many countries (575).
The final stage of Yoo s argument has the merit that it is reduces to
nonsense a whole tradition of secular authority in international rela-
tions that Campbell highlights as beginning with Hobbes and the
Westphalia settlement: the apparent construction of order based upon
the opposition of the domestic and the foreign and the paradox of a
state system, which rests upon the mutually exclusive suppositions
that each is a self for itself and an other for all the others. Yoo finds
himself, along with the whole of the international law profession,
trapped in what is not a logic of his own making. Starting from the
reasonable supposition that the degree of harm from an WMD attack
would be catastrophic, he appears to commit himself to the view that
danger is unlimited in degree, all-pervasive in extent, and requiring
ceaseless preemptive attacks. In other words, we are in an impossible
position, at the bankrupted end of an international law tradition:
Thus, even if the probability that a rogue nation would attack the United
States directly with WMD were not certain, the exceptionally high degree
of harm that would result, combined with a limited window of opportun-
ity and the likelihood that if the United States did not act, the threat would
increase, could lead a nation to conclude that military action is necessary
in self-defense. Indeed, as President Bush recently cautioned: If we wait
for threats fully to materialize, we will have waited too long. (576)
Notes
1 Revised edition (1998).
2 Ibid., 46.
3 Ibid., 47, quoting Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age
(1983), xxiv.
4 Ibid., 48 50.
5 Ibid., 51.
6 Ibid., 65.
7 Ibid., 31.
8 Ibid., 62.
9 Ibid., 65.
10 In The Dilemma of Zealous Nationalism (2003).
11 Harvard University Press, 2004.
M637 CARTY TEXT M/UP.qxd 16/1/07 9:46 AM Page 162 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Ga
162 Philosophy of International Law
12 Especially chapters 5 and 6.
13 Harvard University Press, 1990.
14 New York Times, October 17, 2004. I am grateful to my Westminster
and American law colleague Andrea Jarman for bringing this article to
my attention.
15 Jewett and Lawrence explain Wallis s own theological views about
responses to 9/11 at CACAE, 3.
16 Council of Foreign Relations (1997).
17 Cambridge, 2004, 192.
18 The United States etc., 155.
19 Ibid., 160 1.
20 AJIL 97, No. 3 (July 2003) 628 42.
21 The United States etc., 155 and 161.
22 AJIL 97, No. 3 (July 2003) 585 90.
23 AJIL 97 No. 3 (2003) 576 85.
24 AJIL 97 (2003) 563 76.
M637 CARTY TEXT M/UP.qxd 16/1/07 9:46 AM Page 163 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Ga
6
MARXISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
1
INTRODUCTION
Rumors of the death of socialism have been, oddly enough, accom-
panied by rumors of the disappearance of the United States. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]